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Abstract 
Agriculture is the backbone of many countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, lack of efficient 
extension systems to support agricultural development is widely seen as a missing link in 
agricultural transformation in the region. International development agencies have in the 
past four decades invested heavily in various extension models such as the Training and 
Visit and Farmer Field School systems in order to enhance the performance of extension 
workers. Despite such investments, the performance of extension agents does remain sub-
optimal in many contexts. Studies in other sectors show that incentivizing worker 
performance through nudges such as incentive realignment schemes that tie worker 
performance to a pay/bonus system could enhance worker productivity. However, there is a 
lack of incentive realignment studies that estimate the performance of extension agents in 
sub-Saharan Africa. A potential hindrance to the application of such scheme to extension is 
the absence of monitoring mechanisms to track the performance of extension agents who 
often work across diverse local contexts to reach smallholder farmers with extension advice. 
This study empirically estimates the effect of an information communication technology 
(ICT)-based payment incentive system that tracks the performance of extension workers in 
rural Uganda. It undertakes a quasi-experimental ex-post impact assessment of a payment 
incentive realignment as an exogenous shift in the price of labor for extension services by 
Ugandan Community Knowledge Workers (CKWs) in 2011. This study applies a 
difference–in–difference	with	 propensity	 score	matching	 technique	 to	 estimate	 the	
effect	of	an	ICT-based	incentive	re-alignment	scheme	in	2011,	on	the	performance	of	
461	CKWs	in	rural	Uganda.	The study shows that CKWs in rural Uganda respond positively 
to an ICT-based performance incentive scheme that affects the price of labor. Results suggest 
that such performance systems can enhance the productivity of CKWs – an exemplar of rural 
extension agents in Uganda and elsewhere in developing countries. It also finds that younger 
CKWs respond more productively to higher incentives than their older counterparts. 
Therefore, the study suggests that extension policies that tie extension agents’ performance 
to ICT-based payment incentives could enhance their performance and contribute towards 
the sustainable developments goals on food security, among others, through multiplier 
effects.  
 




 DOI: 10.18697/ajfand.84.BLFB1007 14115 
Introduction	
Agricultural extension (henceforth, extension) has historically been a crucial part of 
agricultural development through outreach to farmers across rural communities (Garforth, 
1982; Jarrett. 1985; Wellard et al., 2013; Wossen et al., 2017). It remains a vital element of 
agricultural development in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) where poverty and low agricultural 
productivity persist in the face of socio-economic and biophysical stressors (Moore and 
Harder 2015; IPCC, 2018; World Economic Forum, 2018). Rising global population and 
food demands also pose a challenge to agricultural development in SSA to balance excess 
food demands with food supply by 2050 (FAO, 2009, 2016). Thus, enhancing the 
productivity of extension components (such as the labor outcomes of local extension 
agents) as an important agricultural sub-sector, could enhance agricultural development. 
Efficient delivery of extension services to smallholder farmers could improve their 
agricultural outputs such as crop yields (Komarek and Ahmadi-Esfahani, 2011; Wellard et 
al., 2013; Wossen et al., 2017).  
 
However, several institutional and structural problems limit the productivity of extension 
systems in SSA (Wellard et al, 2013). One important challenge is weak attribution due to 
poor monitoring mechanisms for tracking the performance of extension agents (Davis, 
2008; Moore and Harder, 2015; Purcell and Anderson, 1997). This limits the precise 
measurement of the effects of extension on agricultural production (Anderson and Feder, 
2004; Bindlish and Evenson, 1997). Poor monitoring mechanisms for extension agents 
further leads to weak extension systems (Anderson, 2008; Davis, 2008; Birkhaeuser et al., 
1991), which limits agricultural production and economic development in the region. For 
instance, due to weak extension systems, the Green Revolution of the 1970s that occurred 
in Asia and caused huge national outputs for many agrarian economies never occurred in 
SSA despite large donor funding (Gollin et al., 2002).  
 
To enhance agricultural development through improved extension systems in SSA, various 
formal and informal models of extension have been implemented in the past decades 
(Chowa et al., 2013; Davis, 2008). Formal extension systems are predominantly 
implemented by government ministries of agriculture in the public sector and agro-input 
dealers in the private sector. Popular extension approaches are the Training and Visit (T 
and V) system, Integrated Agricultural Development Programs (IADPs), and Farmer Field 
Schools (FFS), which have been popular in SSA and elsewhere (Bindlish and Evenson, 
1997; Chowa et al., 2013; Davis, 2008).  
 
Despite the popularity of these prior interventions, however, the outcomes of extension 
systems in SSA remained unsatisfactory and most extension models were unsustainable, 
thereby requiring a restructuring and reinvention of extension systems in the region 
(Anderson and Feder, 2004; Picciotto and Anderson, 1997; Davis, 2008). For example, 
models like T and V utilize top-down extension approaches wherein information flow 
mainly from government ministries of agriculture or agricultural colleges and universities, 
through extension agents, to farmers (Davis, 2008). Top- down models in many cases failed 
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to empower rural smallholder farmers (Gautam and Anderson, 1999; Wellard et al, 2013), 
which led to the need for pluralistic extension systems that presumably provide better 
access to extension for smallholder farmers (Chowa et al., 2013; Davis, 2008; Pritchett and 
Woolcock, 2004).  
 
Pluralistic approaches are inclusive of a variety of information sources and stakeholders 
beyond just the formal top-down pathway. These may include private companies, NGOs, 
farmer-led cooperative organizations, informal social networks and ICTs (Chowa et al., 
2013; Koehnen, 2011; Strong et al., 2014; Tata and McNamara, 2018). The extension 
system in the United States (US) is an example of a pluralistic system that was pivotal to 
the success of commercial agriculture in the US (Garret, 2001). Key among its facets was 
the dynamic linkage of colleges with rural communities through the land grant system. 
Extension workers, employed by the state, serve as conduits for disseminating critical 
innovative technologies and practices among farming communities, especially in rural areas 
(Garrett, 2001; Wellard et al, 2013). This top-down formal system is complemented by a 
host of companies and other organizations available to advise farmers on new strategies 
and respond to individual concerns. Although extension approaches in many developing 
countries are loosely based on this US extension framework, in many cases, these systems 
are yet to replicate the success of the US model.  
 
Advances in information communication technologies (ICTs) present an opportunity for 
modernizing agricultural extension by incorporating ICT-based systems (Aker, 2011) such 
as the use of cellphones to provide extension advice to smallholder farmers (Koehnen, 
2011; Strong et al., 2014; Tata and McNamara, 2018). There are two important ways that 
ICTs can improve agriculture. First, ICTs can improve farmers’ access to extension advice 
in crucial aspects like market information, weather, and nutritional information, thereby 
increasing farm productivity and welfare outcomes (Aker, 2011; Anastasios et al., 2010; 
Barakabitze et al., 2015; Tata and McNamara, 2018). Second, ICTs can serve as a hub for 
agricultural and farmer records such as farm surveys and other critical information through 
the concept of digital agriculture (Shepherd et al., 2018). 
 
Despite the rising opportunities for extension agents to optimize the use of ICTs to provide 
agricultural information to farmers and enhance agricultural productivity (Koehnen, 2011; 
Tata and McNamara, 2018; World Economic Forum, 2018), there is little evidence in the 
literature on the effects of ICT use in extension delivery in SSA. Moreover, there is limited 
information on how to efficiently improve extension systems in SSA and elsewhere in the 
developing world.  
 
This study addresses the gap in the literature about inducing extension agents’ performance 
through ICT-based monitoring schemes. It analyzes the effect of an incentive re-alignment 
scheme on the performance of community knowledge workers (CKWs) who work as rural 
extension agents in Uganda. It undertakes an ex-post impact assessment of the effect of an 
ICT-based monitoring incentive scheme introduced by Grameen Foundation in Uganda for 
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their CKW program in the rural areas of the country. In 2009, Grameen Foundation 
established the CKW program in Uganda to address weak extension performance in the 
country by using ICTs to enhance the provision of extension services (Amadu et al., 2015; 
McCole et al., 2014). To induce higher performance of CKWs, Grameen Foundation 
instituted a phased incentive re-alignment scheme in 2011, which sought to reward CWKs 
based on their monthly performance in reaching farmers with extension advice. During that 
time, extension agents in certain districts received a 50-percent increase in their salaries 
(Grameen Foundation, 2014).  
 
The goal of this study is to determine whether the increased payment incentive caused a 
positive supply-response in extension delivery. It utilizes a difference-in-difference 
estimation and propensity score matching to estimate the effect of the incentive realignment 
on CKW performance in rural Uganda. It hypothesizes that CKWs respond positively to an 
upward shift in their performance incentives, which are tracked by an app called Salesforce, 
installed on their program cellphone. The article measures CKW performance by their 
monthly total searches recorded in Salesforce in 2011 and 2012. 
 
This study contributes to the literature by performing an empirical analysis of the CKW 
extension system and determining the labor supply response of CKWs in such a fluid 
development setting as SSA. Thus, it contributes to opening the black box of extension 
management and administration through a component-by-component analysis of the 
system.  
 
The next section of this article reviews related literature, followed by a section presenting 
the conceptual framework. Then we discuss the empirical and estimation strategy, and then 




Extension in Uganda and the Community knowledge Worker program 
Extension in Uganda has undergone dramatic changes over the past fifteen years. In 2001, 
the Government of Uganda (GoU) revamped its national extension strategy and established 
a National Agricultural Advisory Service (NAADS), which utilized a public-private 
partnership approach. It decentralized extension services to district and sub-district levels, 
and promoted farmer organizations, by registering them into a system whereby they could 
access extension advice through NGOs and private entities, and to manage procurement for 
quality delivery through a monitoring and evaluation system (McCole et al., 2014).  
 
Two studies (Benin et al., 2007 and 2011) found positive and statistically significant 
impacts of NAADS on extension delivery and a positive economic return by 49%; as well 
as establishing that NAADS enhanced the adoption of improved agricultural practices by 
facilitating access to new crop technologies and livestock activities, among others. Despite 
such positive impacts, NAADS was criticized for waste, corruption and inefficiency, and 
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farmers complained about poor access to inputs, such as credits and pest management 
advice (McCole et al., 2014). Due to such problems and other institutional challenges, the 
GoU disbanded NAADS and reconstituted the extension system as a national entity 
(McCole et al., 2014). 
 
In 2009, Grameen Foundation, a joint winner of the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize along with its 
founder, Mohamed Yunus (Nobel Peace Prize, 2006), established the CKW program in 
Uganda. The CKW program is a participatory extension program that utilizes the 
interaction of ICT capabilities with local knowledge. Grameen Foundation does not require 
CKWs to have prior ICT or other technical expertise as prerequisite for their employment 
with the program. Instead, CKWs received training on the use of a smartphone containing 
an agricultural information database that extend community extension services to farmers 
(Grameen Foundation, 2014). 
 
The CKW smartphones contain an app called CKW-Search, which stores agricultural 
advisory information (Van Campenhout, 2017). Each CKW mainly finds information for 
farmer-specific problems relating to their crops or animals. For example, when a farmer 
notices a yellow spot on his/her cassava leaves, he/she informs a CKW about the problem. 
The CKW in turn, searches the database in the smartphone for the solution to the problem, 
which in this case could possibly be cassava mosaic. They also use the search function to 
allocate market, price and weather-related information, which guides farmers’ cropping and 
marketing decisions on a regular basis (Grameen Foundation, 2014). Thus, through CKW-
Search, farmers can access state-of-the-art agricultural information in the most remote 
regions of Uganda, whether or not they personally own a cell phone. Performance measure 
for CKWs is the number of searches they perform for farmers on monthly basis. The 
number of searches done by each CKW is captured as a query after each interaction with a 
farmer in their locality (Amadu et al., 2015; Grameen Foundation, 2014). 
 
Prior to the CKW program in Uganda, extension service delivery mainly occurred through 
the Ministry of Agriculture with some inputs from NGOs. However, diverse challenges 
with government operational systems, as described above, skewed the supply of extension 
services. For example, it is reported that services were skewed toward rich and affluent 
farmers (Van Campenhout, 2017; McCole et al., 2014). Moreover, poor infrastructure 
facilities hindered rural producers from realizing optimal gains from their agricultural 
products. For instance, Komarek and Ahmadi-Esfahani (2011) showed that the GoU had 
no direct regulation of prices. Instead, middlemen who served as the gateway to any high 
demand for agricultural commodities often got at least 38% of final sale price for products 
in urban areas, exacerbating the poverty situation of smallholders in rural areas (McCole et 
al., 2014; Svensson and Yanagizawa, 2009). The CKW model, therefore, serves to reduce 
this information asymmetry and disparity in wealth distribution between the urban and rural 
communities by providing farmers with access to pricing information and markets to sell 
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Community Knowledge Workers (CKW)-Search is kept up-to-date with appropriate crop, 
livestock, weather, and market price information. The updates are enhanced by 
collaboration with various institutions as service partners, including both local and regional 
research institutions, such as Makerere University, International Institute of Tropical 
Agriculture and MTN-Uganda as the leading cellular service provider in the country 
(Amadu et al., 2015). In addition to providing extension services, CKWs undertake farmer 
surveys and collect farmer-specific information that is transmitted to Grameen Foundation 
for service improvement. Information collected by CKWs is transmitted via a cloud-based 
server called Salesforce, which is managed by staff at the Grameen Foundation 
headquarters in Kampala.  
 
For CKWs to provide uninterrupted extension services in rural communities where power 
is a major challenge, their operational CKW smartphones have solar panels which power a 
CKW’s home1. As a back-up measure, the CKW smartphones can store daily transactions 
(for example search outcomes) during operation in an area with weak cellphone coverage. 
When the CKW comes within cellphone coverage, he/she can then transmit the information 
to Salesforce. 
 
Being local farmers themselves, CKWs could utilize the agricultural information in the 
smartphones for their own farming practices. That way, they have a practical experience of 
the information they provide to other farmers. Thus, CKWs are often regarded as local 
farming experts in their communities. The CKW program operates on the premise that 
extension agents who live and work within their local communities are more efficient in 
delivering extension services in their communities compared to traditional extension 
workers who often are non-resident in the local communities they serve. Hence, unlike 
traditional extension workers, CKWs have ability to reach the last mile in extension 
delivery (Amadu et al., 2015; McCole et al., 2014). In addition to the CKW-Search, CKWs 
register new farmers on a monthly basis and give them appropriate identification cards 
(IDs). The registrations encourage farmer participation in the program as they are placed 
into farmer groups where they can collectively implement ideas from CKWs.  
 
There is a regulatory system for CKW activities which monitors their daily operations, 
ensuring that each CKW-search conducted is captured in Salesforce. Like the farmers they 
register, CKWs have IDs. Each CKW-Search is thus submitted in Salesforce along with 
CKW and respective farmer IDs, the geo-spatial code, and the time the CKW-Search 
occurred. This helps Grameen to remotely validate the performance of CKWs (Grameen 
Foundation, 2014). The same process serves as a means of incentivizing CKW performance 
(based on the total monthly CKW-searches performed by respective CKWs). Staff at 
																																																								
1 CKWs are allowed to use this solar panel facility to charge cellphones for community members 
for small fees, established by the community elders and Grameen. The tokens from the charging 
services belong to CKWs as an extra incentive. Such incentives are, however, not considered in 
this analysis  
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Grameen Foundation headquarters in Kampala reviews each recorded query. Discrepancies 
are crosschecked and corrected normally by CKW coordinators, who provide an additional 
layer in the leadership hierarchy (McCole et al., 2014).   
 
As stated above, Grameen Foundation implemented a phased incentive re-alignment in 
June 2011 in order to induce CKW performance. Performance is graded on an A, B, C and 
D basis, with a grade of an A being topmost. The monthly pay for top performance was 
raised by 50%. That is, any CKW who scores an A, gets an extra 50% of their monthly pay. 
The threshold for an A performance is a minimum of 48 CKW-Searches, 8 surveys and 15 
farmer registrations in any given month (Grameen Foundation, 2014). Because Grameen 
Foundation usually conducted baseline surveys for agro-based and other rural development 
agencies (like World Food Program and East Africa Dairy Development) at a fee, they 
assign top-performing CKWs to those surveys for additional incentives (Grameen 
Foundation, 2014; McCole et al., 2014). 
 
Conceptual framework  
Various studies (Powers, 2009; Fehr and Goette, 2007; Card and Krueger, 1994) have 
analyzed the effect of wage variation on labor outcomes. For instance, using a natural 
experiment, Card and Krueger (1994) analyzed the effect of a minimum wage change 
policy on industry labor supply in New Jersey. They used a Difference–in –Difference 
analysis to examine the effect of a minimum wage raise policy on employment in the fast-
food industry in the New Jersey, USA. Using Pennsylvania as the control, Card and Krueger 
(1994) found that contrary to the standard competitive economic theory, a minimum wage 
increase (and by extension, increase in the total cost of production for the fast-food 
industry) in New Jersey resulted in a drop in average employment in the state. They found 
that the minimum wage increase was transferred to fast food consumers through higher 
product prices.  
 
Specifically, Card and Krueger (1994) found that fast-food prices rose drastically in New 
Jersey compared to corresponding prices in Pennsylvania. Building on Card and Krueger 
(1994), Powers (2009) analyzed the effect of a minimum wage increase in Illinois while 
holding Indiana as a control, and found some decline in the total amount of hours worked 
in the study area. In line with many studies on labor outcomes, the analyses of these two 
studies emphasize employers’ response to a hike in minimum wage. However, literature on 
the effects of a wage hike on actual performance of agricultural extension workers remains 
largely unexplored, at least to our knowledge.  
 
Although it is well known that workers tend to respond positively to an increase in wages 
by giving up more time in order to achieve a higher target wage, individuals can only offer 
so much time towards labor within their total time endowment. Therefore, like every other 
commodity, labor supply is finite (Cherchye and Vermeulen, 2008). We contribute to this 
topic by performing an ex-post impact assessment of the performance of extension workers 
in response to a wage hike in rural Uganda through the Grameen Foundation program. 
	
	
 DOI: 10.18697/ajfand.84.BLFB1007 14121 
Our conceptual labor supply model carefully follows Fehr and Goette (2007). We assume 
that within a given period of time (on monthly basis) an extension agent can choose to 





𝕦(c&, e&, x&),																																																																										(1) 
 










where 𝛿 < 1 represents a discount factor of time with total time denoted as t. Since CKW 
performance is measured on a monthly basis, t in this context represents total time in a 
month. The variable 𝑒= denotes the total monthly effort, and measured by the number of 
valid monthly CKW-Searches. The general monthly consumption of a CKW is denoted by 
𝑐=, while 𝑥=	denotes a factor that influences how many hours of work s/he allocates towards 
extension in a given month. For instance, CKWs with larger households might have higher 
consumption spending demand and thus, higher incentives to work more in order to reach 
higher performance targets and obtain more pay. It is also possible that having a large 
household may reduce the total time available for work if events in the household such as 
illness constraint a CKW from working extra hours. Thus, for brevity, let 𝑥=	denote 
preference for work. 
 
Moreover, since the CKWs are also farmers in their respective communities, we note that 
if a CKW allocates, say k amount of time towards extension in any given month, s/he would 
have (n - k) time left for own farm labor and leisure. In the constraint function, 𝕡=2 represents 
prices for consumables such as staple crops. Since CKWs have monthly performance 
targets, let 𝑤=2𝑒= be the wage/compensation per unit of effort (𝑒=) in a given month. Income 
from other sources (other avenues besides monthly compensation) is denoted as 𝑦=. Assume 
that the utility function is strictly concave in 𝑐=, 𝑒=, and takes the form 𝕦B	 > 0, and 𝕦E	 <
0, the interest rate (which determines the real worth of wages received) is taken as given 
for the CKW economy.  
 
Fehr and Goette (2007, p. 304) shows that in the given time period, the decision of a rational 
individual maximizing a time-separable concave utility function and subject to constraints, 
can be represented in terms of a linear one-time utility function. 
We write the state utility function as: 
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“Where 𝑔(𝑒=, 𝑥=) is strictly convex in 𝑒=and measures the discounted disutility of effort” 
(Fehr and Goette, 2007, p. 304). The variable, 𝑥= captures the exogenous shift of effort 
disutility.  
 
Since time can be used to improve wealth status from investments in assets accumulation, 
such as family plantation, and livestock, we denote the marginal utility of time as l, and wt 
to represent discounted monthly wage for top performance. Thus, lwt𝑒= can be interpreted 
as the discounted utility of income arising from efforts in period t” (Fehr & Goette, 2007, 
p. 304). Thus, extension agents who choose efforts in accordance with the one-time utility 
equation, would respond positively with a higher effort, 𝑒=, to a rise in wt because “a rise 
in wt increases the marginal utility returns of effort lwt, which increases the effort level, 
et* that maximizes 𝑣	(𝑒=, 𝑥=)”  (Fehr & Goette, 2007). 
 
Empirical and identification strategy 
 
This study utilizes difference-in-difference analysis to estimate the effect of an incentive-
based wage re-alignment for extension agents in rural Uganda. Difference-in-differences 
constitutes a popular impact assessment technique in settings on policy changes such as 
social outcomes (Van Campenhout, 2017; Powers, 2009; Duflo et al., 2008). We posit that 
the total monthly performance of CKWs in Uganda varies linearly with a set of individual 
characteristics (both observable and unobservable) such as ability, family size, and age.  
 
Let 𝕐I=  represent agents’ performance in a given month in both the treated and controlled 
districts. Thus, we want to compute the average monthly performance (𝕐I=T) of any CKW 
when s/he resides in a treated district and 𝕐I=C for a CKW when s/he resides in a controlled 
district. Our interest is to determine the effect of the incentive re-alignment by computing 
𝕐I=T – 𝕐I=C. However, since we cannot both observe a CKW with treatment and without 
treatment, we compute the average treatment effects of all CKW’s per district. This is 
plausible because although every CKW has two potential performance outcomes 
(corresponding to both treatment and controlled scenarios), only one outcome per CKW is 
observed in reality (Duflo et al., 2008). Therefore, the expected average effect of incentive 
re-alignment on CKWs in the entire population of choice is E[𝕐I=T – 𝕐I=C]. That is, the 
difference between the expected performances of a CKW in the treated district had he not 
undergone treatment. We estimate the basic empirical model thusly; 
 
																																				𝕐I= = 	Θ + 	lΧ= 	+ 	𝛿ΧI 		+ 	𝜉I=																																																		(4) 
 
Where 𝕐I=  denotes the monthly performance of an individual CKW at time t. The variable, 
Θ is a constant, and Χ=  is a vector of dummy variables that denote treatment status (equal to 
one if a CKW belongs to the treatment group, and zero, otherwise). The coefficient l 
estimates the average incentive realignment effect while ΧI represent individual-specific 
covariates such as age, education (and by implication, ability) for which we use the number 
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of training sessions CKW has attended, as proxy. Furthermore, it is assumed that that the 
errors 𝜉I= are independent and identically generated. 
 
The treatment group includes districts where the incentive re-alignment occurred in June 
2011 whereas the control group consists of districts where incentive re-alignment did not 
occur in June 2011. By June 2011, Grameen Foundation had reached at least 15 districts in 
Uganda including the initial districts they started with during the pilot phase in 2008. We 
select a total of eight districts, including four treatment districts and four districts as the 
control group.  
 
Treatment districts include two of the pilot districts, Bushenyi and Mbale, plus two 
additional districts, Pader and Loweru. The control districts are neighbors to the treated 
districts where the incentive raise did not occur in June 2011. Control districts include 
Kasese (neighbor to Bushenyi) in the Southwest, Masindi (neighbor to Loweru) in the 
Northwest to central Uganda, Kitgum (neighbor to Pader) in the North, and Kapchorwa 
(neighbor to Mbale) in the East.  All the control districts are similar to the treatment districts 
in many aspects.  For example, they share neighboring boundaries, similar agro-climatic 
zones and other important factors that affect transaction costs including proximity to urban 
markets such as Kampala.  
 
Data 
Data for this study come from administrative records of the monthly performance of 461 
CKWs in 2011/2012 agricultural season in Uganda, to determine their supply response to 
the incentive realignment introduced by Grameen Foundation in 2012. Duflo et al. (2008) 
shows that using administrative data in such contexts as the present setting, introduces 
randomization in the analysis. In particular, this study assumes that the use of administrative 
data eliminates potential selection bias because CKWs had to decide on the selection 
process at the administrative level of the program in terms of program placement. The study 
utilizes monthly performance records for a 12-month period including January to December 
2011. Of the total of 461 CKWs for which data was available, 238 come from treated 
districts while 223 are from the control districts.  
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the main variables of interest including monthly 
agent performance in waves one and two across the control and treatment districts. It also 
includes individual characteristics of CKWs across the two groups over the two periods2. 
The total number of observations in our panel data set is 5532. In wave one, the average 
monthly agent performance in the control and treated districts corresponds to 37 and 35 
search3, respectively. The corresponding standard deviations are 9.41 and 10.25, 
respectively.  
																																																								
2 Individual CKW characteristics variables are fixed across the two periods. Thus, DD analysis is 
mainly based on the monthly performance records of CKWs 
3 Note that performance is measured in terms of total monthly searches 
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In wave two, the average monthly performance in the control districts is 41, with a standard 
deviation of 7.63, while the average performance in the treated group is 49 with standard 
deviation 5.08. The average age of CKWs in the control and treated groups is 40 and 38 
years, respectively. In wave 1 and wave 2, CKWs in the control districts have an average 
of four trainings compared to those in the treated districts having an average of five 
trainings. On average, there are two farmers’ groups per CKW across the control and treated 
groups.   
 
Individual characteristics across the control and treated groups are similar with minor 
variations. For example, average household size across the two sets of districts (control and 
treated districts) is 6, with similar standard deviations (1.79 and 1.8, respectively). The 
average number of children also in the two groups is 3 with standard deviations of 0.89 and 
0.97 for the control and treated districts, respectively. In terms of asset4 ownership across 
the two groups, the average dollar value of assets in the control districts is $3605, while the 
average dollar value of assets in the treated districts is $4157. The average amount of debt5 
(also measured in USD) across the two groups is $379 for the control group, and $359 for 
the treated group.  
 
Educational attainment of agents is similar across the two groups. At least 80% of agents 
have basic education (high school education at the minimum). In terms of gender, 61% of 
agents in the control group are male, while 63% in the treated group are male. Terrain 
differences are also similar across the two groups. In particular, 29% of agents in the control 
districts work across hilly terrains compared to 32% of agents in the treated group.  
 
The main farm commitment variable, which implies whether a CKW is fully involved in 
both crop production and livestock rearing as part of his/her household farming activities, or 
whether an agent fully engages in only one of either crops or livestock rearing as the main 
farming activity, is slightly different between the two groups. In the control group, 46% of 
agents undertake only crop farming, while 48% of the treated group reported cultivating 
crops only.  
 
Transportation ownership in the form of bicycles constitutes a vital means of transport in the 
rural areas where public transportation facilities are lacking. During recruitment, CKWs 
usually receive bicycles on loan so as to facilitate their work in the communities. However, 
																																																								
4 Family plantation, amount of livestock owned, or other forms of property such as mud brick 
housing, provide a measure of assets in this setting as in many rural communities in sub-Saharan 
Africa  
5 Most of the debt owed constitutes some of the valuable assets offered by Grameen on loan to 
CKWs, for which they make regular payments. For example, the bicycles (for those who receive 
bicycles), cellphones, and the solar panel with charger are all offered on loan to CKWs, as part of 
their recruitment package 
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due to the financial cost of having the bicycles, some CKWs prefer not to have a bicycle. 
Only 40% of agents in the control districts have a bicycle, compared to 44% in the treated 
districts for their activities. Moreover, most CKWs in the two groups are household heads. 
In particular, about 60% in the control group are household heads, and 67% in the treated 
group are household heads. 
 
Table 1a: Descriptive Statistics Wave 1  
 Control (n=669) Treated (n=714) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Monthly 
performance 
36.66 9.41 11 64 34.61 10.25 9 66 
Age 40 12.38 21 67 38 11.30 18 67 
No. training 4 1.37 3 7 5 1.28 3 7 
No. children 3 0.89 1 5 3 0.97 1 6 
Household size 6 1.79 1 9 6 1.80 1 10 
Number farmers 
groups 
2.46 1.38 1 8 2.45 1.33 1 7 
Educational 
attainment  
0.81 0.39 0 1 0.80 0.40 0 1 
Assets (USD) 3605 4245 188 2182 4157 5590 188 420
2 
Debt (USD)  379 343 100 1812 359 332 40 181
2 
Male 0.61 0.49 0 1 0.63 0.48 0 1 
Hilly terrain 0.29 0.45 0 1 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Main farm 
commitment 
0.46 0.50 0 1 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Marital status 0.70 0.46 0 1 0.74 0.44 0 1 
Bicycle ownership 0.40 0.49 0 1 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Household head 0.60 0.49 0 1 0.66 0.47 0 1 
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Table 1b: Descriptive Statistics Wave 2 
 Control (n=892) Treated (n=952) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Monthly 
performance 
41.07 7.63 19 63 49 5.08 25 69 
Age 40 12.38 21 67 38 11.30 18 67 
No. training 4 1.37 3 7 5 1.28 3 7 
No. children 3 0.89 1 5 3 0.97 1 6 
Household 
size 
6 1.79 1 9 6 1.80 1 10 
No. farmers 
groups 
2.46 1.38 1 8 2.45 1.33 1 7 
Educational 
attainment  
0.81 0.39 0 1 0.80 0.40 0 1 
Assets (USD) 3605 4245 188 2182 4157 5590 188 4202 
Debt (USD)  379 343 100 1812 359 332 40 1812 
Male 0.61 0.49 0 1 0.63 0.48 0 1 
Hilly terrain 0.29 0.45 0 1 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Main farm 
commitment 
0.46 0.50 0 1 0.48 0.50 0 1 




0.40 0.49 0 1 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Household 
head 
0.60 0.49 0 1 0.66 0.47 0 1 
Note: n= number of observations per wave. 
 
Results and discussion 
Table 2 shows the individual covariate effects on the probability of being receiving the 
performance incentive (the treatment regime) for a CKW in the research setting. 	
Table 2 shows that a one-unit change in the age variable decreases the probability of CKW 
being participating in the program by 1.5%. Thus, younger CKWs are more likely to take 
advantage of such schemes. One possible explanation for this result is that on average, 
younger CKWs might be more energetic, and thus better able to take advantage of higher 
incentive opportunities compared to their older counterparts. This possibility of supply 
response issue associated with age could make it necessary to adjust extension 
wage/incentive policies that favor the youths in SSA. Such a policy could significantly 
enhance rural development by reversing rural-urban migration, and stimulating economic 
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Table 2 also shows that larger households, depicted by having an additional child, have a 
higher probability of participating in the incentive realignment scheme (16%) on average 
than lower households. One possible explanation for this outcome is that in such settings 
(as it is with many rural areas across sub-Saharan Africa) in general larger household sizes 
facilitate labor for agricultural and other livelihood activities. For example, children could 
help with household chores as well as agricultural labor for the household. Therefore, 
having higher number of children could provide extra time for a CKW who is a parent, to 
perform community extension service. Another explanation is that children (especially 
toddlers) could present additional financial demands for a typical family. Thus, an 
additional child per household could induce a CKW to desire to maximize the opportunity 
of higher earnings associated with the incentive re-alignment.  
 
Moreover, table 2 shows that household heads have a higher probability of participating 
in the CKW performance realignment program 17% compared to those who are not.  One 
possible explanation for this result is that being a household head induces a CKW to 
maximize a performance-based incentive in order to meet family obligations.  
 
Thus, performance-based incentives could be useful in stimulating higher productivity 
among extension agents in sub-Saharan Africa where extended family systems are 
common across the rural areas such as the present setting.  
 
Although the estimates have a somewhat low Pseudo R-square value, the Log likelihood 
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Table 2:  Determinants of participation in the CKW incentive performance 
realignment scheme  
 
Variable Coefficient P-value 
Age -0.015*** 0.000 
Number of children 0.161*** 0.000 
Household size 0.024 0.226 
Number of farmers’ groups -0.026 0.311 
Educational Attainment                        -0.051 0.563 
Asset in USD                                         0.000 0.035 
Debt in USD                                         -0.000 0.030 
Gender is male                                      -0.007 0.929 
Working in hilly terrain                         0.109 0.157 
Main farm commitment                         0.039 0.632 
Marital Status                                         0.104 0.186 
Bicycle ownership                                 0.077 0.355 
Household status6                                  0.170** 0.027 
Number of trainings                              0.014 0.583 
Pseudo R-square                                    0.0303 - 
Log likelihood                                      -928.87** - 
**Inference: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
 
Main result: Treatment effect 
 
Table 3 presents the main estimates of the difference-in-difference results for this setting. 
It shows that the incentive realignment scheme increased CKW performance by about 10% 
on average. This estimate is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, and shows that 
the incentive realignment had a positive and statistically significant effect on the average 
monthly performance of CKWs in Uganda.  
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Table 3:  Main estimates of difference-in-difference analysis for CKW performance 
in rural Uganda 
            Wave 1 (Baseline)        Wave 2 (Follow-up) 
























Std. errors in parentheses; Significance levels *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; R-square: = 0.3223 
 
Moreover, the main result is of the incentive re-alignment is depicted by figure 1. It shows 
the average performance of extension agents in the treated and control groups after the 
incentive re-alignment took effect. In particular, the average performance of CKWs in the 
treated group is higher than the average performance of their counterparts in the control 
group. This demonstrates that an incentive re-alignment policy through ICT-based 
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Robustness check 
Robustness checks for the consistency of the main results in this study are presented in 
Table 4, which include difference-in-difference estimates with and without covariate, as 
well as with covariates but no matching (kernel matching estimates). It also includes single 
time period (point) estimates for performance in March 2011 and September 2011 
corresponding to wave one and wave two, respectively. Note that March 2011 is exactly 
three months prior to the incentive policy change, while September 2011 is exactly three 
months after the incentive re-alignment policy took effect in June 2011.  
 
Table 4 shows that the main result is not sensitive to specification or other omitted variable 
effects. The robustness estimates are similar to our main result, and thus validate the 
consistency of our main result.  
 
Table 4: Robustness checks  
                                            Wave 1                                Wave 2                              Diff-in- 
Variable                    Control   Treated   Diff.        Control     Treated       Diff          Diff 
Performance              37.56      35.70    -1.86**              41.92      50.10         8.18***     10.04*** 
with covariates          (2.14)      (2.22)   (0.80)          (2.15)       (2.14)        (0.49)     (0.66) 
but no PSM 
 
Point estimate           37.47      35.45    -2.03**              39.07      49.46        10.39***     12.41*** 
with covariates          (0.55)      (0.61)     (0.82)         (0.51)     (0.35)        (0.62)      (0.74) 
and PSM 
 
Point estimate           37.35      35.45    -1.90**              39.02      49.35         10.32***    12.23*** 
without covariates    (0.54)      (0.58)     (0.79)         (0.48)     (0.34)         (0.58)      (0.72) 
and PSM 
 
Observations              223          238         -                223          238            -             3115 
R-square:                                                                                                                    0.3495 




This study has analyzed the effect of an incentive re-alignment scheme on the performance 
(in terms of labor outcomes) of community knowledge workers (CKWs), a special category 
of rural extension agents in Uganda. Despite the widely held view of agriculture’s high 
importance in the economic transformation of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the lack of 
efficient extension systems to support agricultural development is a missing link. Various 
extension models, such as the Training and Visit system, have in the past four decades, 
received many international developmental support, in order to connect this missing link in 
the continent’s agricultural transformation process. Some studies posit that incentives are 
critical for inducing the performance of workers. Moreover, information communication 
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technologies (ICTs) have in the past decade, been widely applied in extension system. Yet, 
there is little empirical evidence of ICT-based extension incentive schemes in SSA.  
 
Moreover, there is little evidence on the impacts of an ICT-based incentives on the 
performance of extension agents in the developing world, especially in SSA. The study 
utilizes a quasi-experimental technique in terms of difference–in–difference with 
propensity score matching (PSM) to estimate the effect of an incentive re-alignment on the 
performance of community knowledge worker (CKWs) in rural Uganda.  
 
The main hypothesis was that an exogenous shift in the price of labor induces CKWs to 
increase labor supply in terms of their monthly performance (measured by monthly Search 
(CKW-Search). Result show that incentive realignment has positive and statistically 
significant effects on the performance of CKWs by 10% on average. In particular, the result 
suggests that rural extension workers in Uganda respond positively to a performance-based 
incentive system. Thus, the finding indicates that higher productivity of rural extension 
systems can be realized in rural Uganda through appropriate performance-based incentive 
schemes.  
 
Determinants of CKW program participation include age of agents (by 1.5% points in favor 
of youths), larger family sizes (by 16%), and being a household head (by 17%). The result 
suggests that a performance-based incentive scheme could be more suitable for the youth 
population and thus, holds a promise of bringing the youth into agriculture through 
participation in incentivized extension schemes. Therefore, since the bulk of the farmers in 
the developing world are in rural areas and in dire need of agricultural extension services, 
a rural extension scheme that targets the youth could enhance rural employment, raise rural 
incomes, reduce rural urban migration, and lead to poverty reduction through multiplier 
effects.  
 
This study contributes to the empirical literature on the performance of extension systems 
in the developing world. It opens the black box of performance evaluation for extension 
systems in SSA by empirically analyzing a unique ICT-monitored extension system in rural 
Uganda. Furthermore, by encouraging higher youth participation in extension through ICT-
based incentives, many supply-side factors of extension systems could be improved. This 
could in turn enhance the productivity of smallholder farmers who immensely depend on 
extension advice for stimulating their agricultural production. It would consequently 
improve agricultural development and sustainable economic growth in SSA and elsewhere 
in the developing world. 
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